A Game Theory Analysis of Options: Contributions to the by Alexandre Ziegler PDF

By Alexandre Ziegler

ISBN-10: 3540656286

ISBN-13: 9783540656289

ISBN-10: 3662215896

ISBN-13: 9783662215890

This booklet offers a mode that mixes online game conception and choice pricing with the intention to learn dynamic multiperson selection difficulties in non-stop time and lower than uncertainty. the fundamental instinct of the strategy is to split the matter of the valuation of payoffs from the research of strategic interactions. while the previous is to be dealt with utilizing alternative pricing, the latter could be addressed via video game idea. The textual content indicates how either tools may be mixed and the way video game conception will be utilized to complicated difficulties of company finance and fiscal intermediation. in addition to delivering theoretical foundations and serving as a consultant to stochastic online game idea modeling in non-stop time, the textual content comprises quite a few examples from the idea of company finance and fiscal intermediation. through combining arbitrage-free valuation strategies with strategic research, the sport conception research of techniques truly offers the hyperlink among markets and companies.

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Additional info for A Game Theory Analysis of Options: Contributions to the Theory of Financial Intermediation in Continuous Time

Example text

Finally, debt value F falls at first, and then rises. Moreover, if the lender would set l/> = 0, then he would wish to liquidate the position as soon as S > 0 . Clearly, this would be suboptimal from the standpoint of the borrower. 44 3. e. ~ > 0), and • the provision that the lender is allowed to call the loan if (and often only if) the borrower defaults on his interest payments. These two characteristics arise from the fact that the lender's claim is worthless if ~ =0 and from his incentive to call the loan as soon as S > ~D(t) / «r - r*)(l- a» if this is not prevented contractually.

Hence, once account is taken of the borrower's capital structure choice, he is indifferent as to which interest rate he effectively has to pay to the lender. Such is not the case, however, for the interest rate differential r - r * . To see this, recall that dy* 2 (62) d(r-r*) -~. 6 The Financing Decision 45 40 35 CD ;:s iii ........ 07 . As r - r * is increased, net equity value rises, implying that an increase in r* reduces net equity value. (r-r*) y* l+at? J. ) )), 1+ r * 1+ a1? which determines the sign of (63), is zero.

2 The Model 35 management) makes the decisions that lie in the best interest of equity holders, possibly at the expense of creditors. 3 values the firm and its different securities. 4 analyzes the last stage of the game, namely, the bankruptcy decision of the equity holders. It demonstrates that the equity holders' bankruptcy choice is suboptimal from the standpoint of the lender. This conflict provides a rationale for some commonly observed characteristics of loan contracts. The agency cost resulting from the socially suboptimal bankruptcy strategy of the equity holders is measured.

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A Game Theory Analysis of Options: Contributions to the Theory of Financial Intermediation in Continuous Time by Alexandre Ziegler

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